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Search Incident to Traffic Arrest-State v. Bell,
215 A.2d 369 (N.J. App. Div. 1965). Defendant
and five companions were riding in an automobile
when stopped by two police officers of the Jersey
City police department for traveling the wrong
way on a one-way street. One officer remained in
the patrol car while his partner checked the
driver's license and car registration papers. While
doing so the officer ordered all the men to get out
of the car. When they did, he saw an eyedropper
on the right side of the back seat. Suspecting a
narcotics offense, he radioed for additional assist-
ance and put the six men up against a wall. When
two detectives reached the scene, they found a
"kit" containing a needle, cap and a glassine
envelope of heroin on the roadway beneath one
of the car windows. The men were then placed
under arrest. A search of the car revealed an
an additional glassine package of heroin.
After defendant was taken to the police station,
a search of his coat turned up another package of
heroin in the lining. Convicted for possessing these
narcotics, defendant appealed on the ground that
the search which disclosed them was the product
of an unconstitutional arrest (when he was
ordered out of the car) and search of the automo-
bile.
In affirming the conviction, the New Jersey
appellate court laid heavy stress on the fact that
the officer who ordered the men out of the car as he
checked the driver's license and papers acted
reasonably to protect himself from attack while
carrying out routine traffic duties. The officer had
testified that he had ordered the men out of the
car because of:
"Safety factors, sir. I had six men stopped.
I'm by myself. I have my partner in the rear
of me. I can't observe six men when they're in
a confined place, so for safety practices so I
don't get my fool head blown off, when I
stop a vehicle loaded with six men, I request
everybody to get out of the car so that I can
watch them."
Though the court found that only the driver
was under arrest (for the traffic violation) when the
men were ordered out of the car, it held that the
order to leave the car was a reasonable and proper
action on the part of the officer. When the eye-
dropper was seen, the court said, "the continued
detention of the six men until the arrival of the
detectives was fully warranted by the suspicions
aroused in a police officer familiar with equipment
used by narcotics addicts .... "
Comment: This case illustrates the considerable
latitude that courts are willing to give a police
officer in detaining and confining traffic violators
under circumstances where the traffic offense, by
itself, would not call for a search or search-
related practices, if the record contains evidence
which shows that the officer's actions had a
reasonable basis. Here the officer testified that the
reason for ordering the men to get out of the car
was to protect himself while he made the traffic
arrest. Because it has long been the law that an
officer, as an incident of a lawful arrest, may
search the person arrested for weapons to protect
himself from attack or to prevent escape, the
lesser action involved here was certainly reason-
able, even though it would have been unreasonable
to attempt a search for evidentiary purposes since
the violation, driving the wrong way on a one-way
street, did not involve evidence for which a search
could reasonably be made.
Joint Trials and Confessions Inculpating Co-
defendants-State v. Young, 215 A.2d 352 (N.J.
1965). The defendant and Charles Williams were
tried together for armed robbery. Williams had
confessed and implicated Young. When Williams'
confession was admitted into evidence against
him, Young's counsel moved that all references
to Young be deleted from the statement before it
was heard by the jury. The trial court denied this
motion, but did instruct the jury then, thereafter
in the trial, and in the final charge, that the
confession was admitted against Williams alone
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and had no probative value insofar as Young was
concerned. The defendant was convicted and ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed,
holding that this procedure was insufficient to pro-
tect Young from prejudice.
The court recognized that although defendant
Young was entitled to be protected from hearsay
evidence, the state had the right to insist on a
joint trial. These rights were reconciled by holding
that the procedure requested by defendant in the
trial court-deletion of inculpatory references to
him in Williams' confession-offered more hope of
preventing prejudice than instructions to the jury
to disregard the unedited confession. The court,
in laying down a rule for the trial of future cases,
said:
"When two or more defendants are indicted
for the same offense and the prosecution
intends to use a confession of one defendant
implicating his codefendants, the problems
relating to the proper use of that confession
should be resolved before trial. Accordingly, if
the prosecutor plans to have the defendants
tried jointly, he must move, on notice to the
defendants, for a judicial determination of
whether there can be an effective deletion of
all references to the codefendants without
prejudice to the confessing defendant. By effec-
tive deletion we mean the elimination of not
only direct aid indirect identification of co-
defendants but of any statements that could be
damaging to the codefendants once their identity
is otherwise established. ***
If it appears that effective deletions are not
feasible and the State still feels that the
confession must be used against the declarant,
the court should order separate trials."
(Emphasis added.)
Multiple Defendants and Comment on Failure
to Testify-State v. McRae, 211 N.E. 2d 875
(Ct.App.Ohio 1965). McRae and a codefendant
were tried together for the crime of grand larceny.
During the trial the codefendant testified in his
own behalf; McRae did not. At the request of the
codefendant, the trial court instructed the jury
that they were to consider the testimony of the
codefendant as they would that of any other
witness, taking into account his interest in the case,
and not disregarding any part of his testimony
simply because he was a defendant. McRae
objected to the giving of this instruction on the
ground that it called attention to the fact that he
did not testify and that the rule of Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) was therefore
violated. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument and affirmed the conviction.
In affirming, the court emphasized that ,the
Griffin rule prohibited only comment by the court
or prosecution on the failure of the defendant to
testify and there was no comment in this case,
only a complaint that the failure of one defendant
to testify was inferentially emphasized by the
giving of the instruction at the request of the co-
defendant. Moreover, the court said, failure to
give the instruction would have violated the rights
of the codefendant who was attempting to make
more efficacious the exercise of his right to testify
in his own behalf.
Probable Cause For Arrest-People v. Brady,
211 N.E. 2d 815 (N.Y. 1965).
Defendant was convicted of concealing stolen
property, but the conviction was reversed by the
appellate court on the ground that the evidence
had been taken in a search incident to an un-
constitutional arrest. The Court of Appeals found
that there had been probable cause for the arrest
and reversed and reinstated the judgment of
conviction.
The arresting officers testified that they had been
keeping a hotel under surveillance because a
number of burglaries had been committed there
recently. They saw defendant leave the hotel and
repeatedly take "little white boxes" out of his
pocket and examine their contents as he walked
along the street. The officers knew that some
months earlier the defendant had been found on
one of the upper floors of the hotel with keys to
five different rooms in his possession. When
stopped, "defendant denied that his name was
Brady and that he had been at the hotel that
evening". In assessing these facts the court held:
"The acts observed by the officers during
their surveillance of the defendant, together
with the information which they had concern-
ing his prior activities, were sufficient to give
them probable cause for believing that a crime
had been committed and that the defendant
had committed it. * * * Under the circum-
stances the interrogation was permissible...
and the obvious falsehoods uttered by the
defendant in reply to the officer's questions
warranted his detention and arrest."
Husband Who Forces the Rape of His Wife by
Another Properly Charged as Principal-State v.
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Blackwell, 407 P.2d 617 (Ore. 1965). Defendant
was found guilty of the rape of his wife by forcing
her and another man to have sexual intercourse.
He appealed on the ground that the indictment
improperly charged him as a principal, i.e., that
"Arnold Blackwell ... did then and there unlaw-
fully and feloniously forcibly ravish one Barbara
Blackwell, a female", since it was the theory of the
state, and the evidence showed, that defendant did
not have forcible intercourse with his wife. The
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected the argument
and affirmed.
The court first noted that defendant did not
claim that it was impossible for a man to be
convicted of the rape of his wife under any circum-
stances, and the court assumed that the Oregon
rape statute incorporated the common law, "i.e.,
a husband cannot be guilty of rape by personally
forcing himself upon his wife... [but] he can be
guilty of rape by forcing his wife to have sexual
intercourse with another".
The defendant argued, however, that "it was
necessary to allege in the indictment that the
defendant committed the rape by forcing another
to have intercourse with his wife". The court
found that an earlier Oregon decision (State v.
Glenn, 370 P.2d 550) had approved of the practice
of indicting an accessory to a rape as a principal.
Although the court recognized that the defendant
Blackwell was not an accessory in this case be-
cause the "defendant was the only criminal actor
as the other man was forced to do the act," that
difference was not controlling since "the broad
principle is that one can be indicted for an act
and convicted upon proof that the defendant did
not personally do the act but was the prime mover
in having another, voluntarily or involuntarily,
perform the actual act". (Emphasis added.)
Defendant Under Cross-Examination and the
Right to Counsel-Commonwealth v. Werner, 214
A.2d 276 (Sup.Ct. Pa. 1965). The defendant was
found guilty of robbery, burglary and conspiracy
and he appealed on the ground that it was error
for the trial court to have restricted his right to
confer with his counsel during a recess called
while the defendant was undergoing cross-examina-
tion by the prosecutor. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania agreed with this contention and re-
versed the conviction.
At the end of the third day of trial, the case was
,recessed until the following morning. At the time
of the recess, the defendant was being cross-
examined by the state and the cross-examination
resumed the next morning. Before recessing, the
court told the defendant:
"Mr. Werner, you are under cross-examina-
tion, so do not discuss the case until your
cross-examination is resumed tomorrow morn-
ing.
Mr. Cirillo (defense counsel): If the court
please, ... can I ask him (the defendant) a
question-I just wanted to ask him if there
are any other witnesses he wants me to call.
The Court: He certainly has a right to confer
with you but I don't want him to discuss this
testimony with you. He is under cross-
examination. But you may ask him questions.
There is no reason you cannot talk to him.
I did not mean to cut off communication
between you.
Mr. Cirillo: All right, sir."'
The conviction was reversed despite the fact
that (1) there was no absolute severance of the
defendant from the aid of his counsel, only an
injunction not to discuss the testimony then
being given, and to be given, under cross-examina-
tion; (2) defense counsel apparently did not
object to this limitation; (3) no prejudice flowing
from the order was demonstrated.
In commenting upon the first point the court
held that "It is not the function of the trial judge
to decide what a defendant's defense should be,
nor when or how that defense should be planned,
nor how much consultation between a defendant
and his retained counsel is necessary to adequately
cope with changing trial situations. That is the
function of counsel. * * * The defendant has the
right to discuss the entire case, including his own
testimony, with his attorney, even [during a
recess]. Discussion of this testimony might have
been very important in determing the future
course of his defense."
The court also held that there was, in the
circumstances of this case, "no knowing and
intelligent waiver" of the right to contest the
order as error on appeal despite the failure to
object in the trial court. And as to the question of
prejudice, the court concluded that any attempt to
demonstrate prejudice would probably require the
disclosure of privileged communcations between
attorney and client, and, further, that in cases
involving the denial of such a fundamental right
as the assistance of counsel, actual prejudice need
not be shown.
Legislative Classification of Narcotics Upheld-
State ex rel Flores v. Taltash, 138 N.W.2d 626
[Vol. 57
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(Minn. 1965). The defendant, arrested with 85
bottles of various narcotic drugs on his person,
was charged with the unlawful possession of
empirin compound with codeine phosphate. He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of 10
to 40 years in the penitentiary. He thereafter
applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that his right to equal protection of the laws was
violated by the statute which made possession of
empirin compound with codeine phosphate illegal
when the possession of an exempt narcotic, e.g.,
codeine cough syrup - which contained a higher
percentage of codeine phosphate - was not
illegal. Relief was denied in the trial court and the
Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed.
At the hearing on the writ a pharmaceutical
expert called by the defense testified that exempt
codeine cough syrup contained one grain of
codeine phosphate per fluid ounce and that the
amount of codeine contained in the average dose
(one teaspoon) was Y6 of a grain. The expert also
testified that the amount of codeine phosphate in
one of the tablets of empirin compound possessed
by the defendant was only Y8 of a grain.
From this testimony, defendant contended that
it was arbitrary and unreasonable to permit the
sale of a compound containing Y of a grain of
narcotic in the average dose, while making illegal
the sale of Y8 grain tablets.
The state, on the other hand, argued that the
"classification is proper because (1) liquid cough
syrup is more difficult to conceal than tablets;
(2) its cost Would be prohibitive if available only
by prescription; and (3) the benefit and conven-
ience to the public in securing cough syrup over
the counter outweigh the potential dangers
inherent in permitting its purchase without a pre-
scription."
The court concluded that "for the reasons
advanced by the state, we are of the opinion the
classification is reasonable and the statute there-
fore valid", following an earlier decision involving
legislative discretion in which it had said that
"the fact that measures taken are not directed at
all of the evils to be corrected does not invalidate
the application of the statute if the problem is
dealt with according to practical exigencies and
experience in a manner which is germane to its
solution."
See Fabio v. City of St. Paul, 126 N.W. 2d 259,
262.
Error To Charge Deadlocked jury on Lesser
Offense-Rvsh v. State, 395 S.W.2d 3 (Ark. 1965).
The defendant was tried on an information charg-
ing him with the first degree murder of his step-
father. Following the evidence and arguments of
counsel, the case was submitted to the jury at
about 2:00 P.M. The jury was given two verdict
forms--guilty or not guilty of first degree murder.
The instructions of the court dealt only with this
charge.
At about 8:00 P.M., the jury was recalled to the
courtroom where the foreman announced that
they were "hung", and that the division of
opinion was ten to two. The jury then continued
its deliberations for the evening, spent the night
in a motel and resumed deliberating the next
morning.
At about 11:30 A.M. the jury again reported
that it was deadlocked and the court gave them a
"get-together" instruction long used in cases
where the jury had not been able to agree after a
reasonable period of deliberation.
At 6:00 P.M., with the jury still divided, the
trial judge recalled them to the courtroom and,
over the objection of the defendant, instructed
them on the offenses of second degree murder and
manslaughter, thus allowing the jury the option of
returning a verdict on either of those charges as an
alternative to the charge of first degree murder
upon which the case had been tried. One hour
later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
murder in the second degree and defendant was
sentenced to twelve years in the penitentiary. He
appealed alleging, inter alia, that it was error for
the court to charge a deadlocked jury on lesser
degrees of guilt. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
agreed and remanded the case for a new trial.
"We cannot," the court said, "put the stamp of
approval on the action of the [trial] court in: first
ascertaining that the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked on first degree murder, and then offering a
charge on second degree murder" since this "was
almost the same as 'bargaining' with the jury.
It is not a question of whether the court should
have given the instruction on second degree
murder at the time the other instructions were given:
the question, here, is the challenge to the court's
action, in waiting 28 hours and ascertaining
that the jury was deadlocked, and then charging
the jury on a lesser degree of the offense." (Empha-
sis added.)
In finding that error had been committed, the
Arkansas court agreed with the rationale of the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Stouter,
75 P. 780, that the vice of the procedure employed
was that such a late charge was "'apparently
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intended to help [the jury], not generally to arrive
at a verdict, but to arrive at some sort of verdict
of guilty... a most dangerous interference with
the right of a defendant to a fair trial." (Emphasis
added.)
Constitutional Rights in The Juvenile Court-
Application of Gault, 407 P. 2d 760 (Ariz. 1965).
Gerald Gault and a companion named Lewis, both
juveniles, were arrested by the police for making
an obscene phone call to a Mrs. C. The boys were
taken to the detention home. The next day, Gault,
his mother and brother, Lewis, his father and two
probation officers appeared before the juvenile
court judge in chambers. A hearing was held on
the charge and though Mrs. C. was not present,
Gerald, according to the testimony of the proba-
tion officer at a later hearing, admitted participat-
ing in the phone call. The judge recessed the
hearing until a future date.
Several days later, Mrs. Gault received a note
from one of the probation officers informing her
that the judge had set a hearing in three days "on
Gerald's delinquency." At this second hearing,
according to the judge, Gerald again admitted
participating in the phone call. Gerald was found
to be delinquent and committed to the Arizona
Industrial School. His parents then filed a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the
juvenile court hearing violated the constitutional
rights of Gerald and that his detention at the
school was, therefore, illegal. A writ was denied
and the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed.
The parents contended that the Juvenile Code of
Arizona violated due process since it "fails to
apprise parents and children of the specific
charges, does not require timely, adequate and
proper notice of a hearing" and that the hearing
held in Gerald's case was unconstitutional since
he was not advised of his right to counsel or his
privilege against self-incrimination and hearsay
evidence was admitted against him.
In its opinion, the Arizona court canvassed the
broad range of cases defining the nature of a
juvenile court hearing and the constitutional
rights possessed by a youth accused of delinquency.
"Our task", said the court, "is to determine the
procedural due process elements to which an infant
and his parents are entitled in a juvenile court
hearing and decide whether our statute may be
construed to include them."
The court acknowledged that the "parent or
guardian must be notified of the hearing, and
anyone whose rights may be affected by the
court's determination must be notified... and
such notice must be given a reasonable time prior
to the hearing. Moreover, the child and parent
must be informed of the alleged act of delinquency
before an adjudication is made." However, the
court said, since the policy behind the treatment of
youthful offenses in special juvenile court proceed-
ings-instead of in criminal trials-"is to hide
youthful errors from the full gaze of the public
and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten
past", due process does not require the same
specificity in pleading required by the criminal
law:
"We think the proper balance between the
infant's right to know the facts of the charge
against him and the state's interest in avoid-
ing or erasing the stigma of delinquency is
best struck by the following rule: the infant
and his parent or guardian will receive a peti-
tion only reciting a conclusion of delinquency.
But no later than the initial hearing by the
judge, they must be advised of the facts
involved in the case. If the charges are denied,
they must be given a reasonable period of
time to prepare." (Emphasis added.)
In considering the right to counsel, the court
noted a split among other state courts on the
question of whether a juvenile is entitled to
counsel or to a warning of the right to counsel.
Though the court had previously held that "the
parents of an infant in a juvenile proceeding can-
not be denied representation by counsel of their
choosing ... a child has different rights and
disabilities." (Emphasis added.) The court con-
cluded that though the judge has the right, in his
discretion, to allow representation, "we do not
think due process requires that an infant have a
right to counsel" since the "parent and the
probation officer may be relied upon to protect the
infant's interests."
"We think", said the court, "the necessary
flexibility for individualized treatment will be
enhanced by a rule which does not require the
judge to advise the infant of a privilege against
self-incrimination" and that the right to confront
witnesses is only "relevant" where the charges are
denied.
In considering whether the usual rules of
evidence are to be applied to a delinquency hearing,
the court held that:
"We think the sounder rule allows the judge
to consider hearsay though the hearing is
contested, but sworn testimony must be
required of all witnesses including police
[Vol. 57
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officers, probation officers and others who are
part of or officially related to the juvenile
court structure. But the hearsay upon which
the judge can rely must be of a kind on which
reasonable men are accustomed to rely in
serious affairs."
The court also noted that other jurisdictions
required burdens of proof in juvenile cases ranging
from a preponderance of the evidence to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In taking a middle
course, the court held that "acknowledging the
non-criminal nature of the proceeding, yet mindful
of the fact that a parent may be deprived of his
child and the child of his liberty, we think the
juvenile judge must be persuaded by clear and
convin ing evidence that the infant has committed
the alleged delinquent act." (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the court decided, Gerald was properly
committed since there "is substantial evidence in
the record to support the finding that Gerald was a
delinquent child" even though there was no
evidence that his parents were "unfit" to retain
custody. "We emphasize the fact", the court said,
"that the child's welfare is the primary considera-
tion before the juvenile court and the judge will
make such order as the child's welfare and the
interests of the state require. It is apparent that
the best interest of a child and the fitness of his
parent are not necessarily inter-dependent".
Grand Jury Testimony and Self-Incrimina-
tion-State v. Griffin, 409 P. 2d 326 (Ore. 1965).
Convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, defendant appealed on the ground that it
was error to allow the state to introduce, in its case
in chief, the transcript of defendant's testimony
before the grand jury which indicted him. The
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this argument
and affirmed the conviction.
The defendant did not question the propriety of
his appearance before the jury and conceded that
he had testified voluntarily. That being so, the
court held, the "prevailing doctrine is that the
privilege of a person not to testify against himself
may be waived, and once waived the privilege as to
the testimony given is gone both in the initial and
subsequent proceedings". (Emphasis added.)
Though the privilege cannot be asserted in
subsequent proceedings, the court warned that this
"means only that the testimony voluntarily given
before the grand jury may be used in later proceed-
ings, not that the witness may be compelled to
testify again". (Emphasis added.)
Comment: Though the court in the Griffin case
was concerned only with a witness-defendant, the
language of the dictum is broad enough to apply to
an ordinary witness. It is one thing to say that the
grand jury testimony of a defendant may be used
against him, but that he may not be compelled to
testify at his trial concerning the same matter
even though his privilege is gone. Encompassed
within the protection of the privilege is not only
freedom from compulsory inculpation, but the
right of a defendant to keep his testimonial
demeanor, and, perhaps, his prior criminal record
affecting his credibility, out of the witness box.
There would seem to be no reason, however, not to
require an ordinary witness to repeat his grand
jury testimony at the trial if the privilege waived
in the grand jury "is gone both in the initial and
subsequent proceedings." If the court meant its
warning against second testimony to include both
kinds of witnesses, the opinion seems unnecessarily
restrictive.
The Law of Confessions Revisited-Phillips v.
State, 139 N.W. 2d 41 (Wis. 1966). Defendant was
convicted of robbery and appealed contending
that his confession should not have been introduced
in evidence against him. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin affirmed in an interesting opinion which
reviews, in some detail, the law of confessions in
the light of recent rulings of the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Conceding that he knew of his right to have the
advice of counsel, and was warned by the police of
the privilege against self-incrimination, defendant
argued that his request for counsel was denied by
the police, or, if the court found that he had not
made such a request, the confession was taken
during an accusatorial stage of the investigation
without a waiver of counsel.
Answering this argument, the court adhered to
its prior interpretation of Escobedo-that absent
a request for counsel no warning or waiver is
required-and refused to follow such cases as
United States ex rel Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.
2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965) "until the Supreme Court
of the United States [makes] a further pronounce-
ment on the problem which it now has under
consideration". The court did hold, however, that
whether a defendant in fact requested counsel in
an "escobedo-type" case "is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law... [and] the subject
of our independent determination on this review."
Reviewing the record, the court found that the
testimony of a police officer that defendant made
no request for counsel until after he confessed, was
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"sufficiently convincing although minimum on
this important point".
The defendant then argued that his confession
was involuntary, claiming that a detective had (1)
confronted him with a cigarette package and told
him that it had fingerprints which could be
analyzed, and (2) threatened to arrest his girl
friend on a charge of adultery unless he confessed.
The court held that the fingerprint statement,
"while accusatorial in nature did not constitute
such a threat as to control and coerce the mind of
the defendant and render the confession involun-
tary since [one must] distinguish between moti-
vation and a compelling overpowering mental
force". The court also concluded that the statement
in reference to the girl friend was motivation more
than coercion because the defendant in his testi-
mony stated he considered it was a threat more to
her than to him", and, while "dangerously close
to the threats disapproved in Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 ... Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S.
534... and in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 ... [it was], standing in context with the other
facts, insufficient to render the confession coerced".
(Emphasis added.)
The defendant next claimed that his confession
was inadmissible since it was taken during a period
of detention which was illegal because of police
failure to promptly bring him before a magistrate
following his arrest. In essence, he argued that the
federal Mallory rule has now acquired constitu-
tional status and is therefore binding upon the
states. In rejecting this argument the court found
that the "rule rests upon the Supreme Court's
superintending authority over the administration
of federal criminal justice and in terms of 'without
unnecessary delay' was adopted as Rule 5(a) of
the federal criminal rules". Since the Supreme
Court of the United States has no "superintending
authority" over state courts or law enforcement
officers, and since Rule 5(a) of the federal rules of
criminal procedure is not binding upon the states,
the court refused to adopt the federal rule.
In rejecting the defendant's Mallory's argument,
however, the Wisconsin court did set forth a new
test involving the problem of detention for
interrogation following arrest. 'WI a voluntary
confession", the court said, "is to be inadmissible
in evidence because it was made under police
detention it must be upon the ground that the
length of detention was a deprivation of the
person's liberty without due process of law." The
court then set forth its understanding of how the
power of the police and the rights of an arrestee
were to be balanced under the new "due process-
detention" test:
"... the due process clause does not foreclose
completely the police from interrogating the
person after arrest and before taking him
before a magistrate. But, the right to interro-
gate after arrest is limited and must be for
the purpose of determining whether to release
the suspect or if he has been arrested without a
warrant to make a formal complaint. An arrest
upon warrant would seem to presuppose
sufficient evidence and its purpose is to cause
the arrested person to be brought before a
magistrate... so that the criminal process
of determining guilt or innocence can com-
mence. A detention for a longer period than
is reasonably necessary for such limited
purpose violates due process and renders in-
admissible any confession obtained during the
unreasonable period of the detention. * * *
While one may be detained by the police and
interrogated to secure sufficient evidence to
either charge him with a crime or to release
him, the police cannot continue to detain an
arrested person to 'sew up' the case by
obtaining or extracting a confession or cul-
pable statements to support the arrest or the guilt."
(Emphasis added.)
The court then noted that the detention for
questioning in this case amounted to about three
and a half hours and was not "so unreasonable as
to violate the due-process clause of our constitu-
tion ....
Comment: Though the court has set out a new
and interesting test of confession admissibility,
there is some doubt about just what it means. For
example, the defendant in the Phillips case was
arrested for robbery, without a warrant, and was
questioned for three and a half hours until he
orally admitted the offense. He then wrote out a
written confession which was signed by him and
witnessed by three police officers.
The court holds this confession admissible.
Seemingly, it falls within the permissible limits of
the rule that if a defendant "has been arrested
without a warrant" the "right to interrogate after
arrest is limited and must be for the purpose of
determining whether to release the suspect or
... to make a formal complaint". The problem,
however, is to determine when this point of
decision has been reached. For example, could not
the determination of whether to release or charge
[Vol. 57
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Phillips have been made as soon as he made his
oral statement? If so, did not his contined deten-
tion resulting in the written confession violate the
other half of the rule that the "police cannot
continue to detain an arrested person to 'sew up'
the case by obtaining or extracting a confession or
culpable statements to support the arrest or the
guilt"?
Under the Phillips test, what is the difference
between interrogation "for the purpose of deter-
mining whether to release.., or... make a
formal complaint" and interrogation "to 'sew up'
the case by obtaining or extracting a confession or
culpable statements to support the arrest or the
guilt"? Is it the difference between admissions and
confessions? Or is it the difference between the
first confession and the second one? Or is it the
difference between a confession of guilt and a
subsequent inculpatory statement revealing the
existence of physical evidence? Seemingly, under
the Phillips residt, whether or not a confession is
admissible would depend almost exclusively upon
the length of the detention, for this is the language
in which the holding is cast. Yet the result test is
completely contrary to the rationale of Phillips
which looks only toward the purpose of the inter-
rogation (whether to charge or release vs. the
"sewing up" of the case) and the existence of other
inculpatory or exculpatory evidence at the time
the decision to charge or release is made.
Until these doubts about the real meaning of
Phillips are dissipated, the opinion will remain
both a rather novel and rather useless precedent
in the confession area.
Qualifying Jury for Death Penalty is Constitu-
tional-People v. Nicolaus, 409 P. 2d 193 (Cal.
1966) and People v. Smith, 409 P. 2d 222 (Cal.
1966). In these two cases the defendants were
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On
appeal they contended that it was unconstitutional
to allow the People to challenge for cause those
jurors with conscientious scruples against impos-
ing the death penalty on the grounds that (1) the
interrogation of potential jurors to discover their
views on capital punishment constitutes "a
brainwashing technique" which overemphasizes
"the freedom of the selected jurors to impose the
death penalty"; (2) "a death-qualified jury does
not constitute a jury of one's peers; ... it cannot
answer guilt-innocence questions as favorably to
the defendant... it cannot be impartial on the
nature of punishment in the event of a conviction
... it does not take into the jury room a pattern of
attitudes characteristic of the community at
large ... [and] such a jury is authoritarian in
nature and not disposed to humanitarianism".
The Supreme Court of California, in rejecting
these arguments, noted that it had considered the
question in previous cases and that if the rule
were otherwise "even one juror committed to a
policy opposed to imposition of the death penalty
in a proper case" could nullify "the rendition of
justice in murder cases."
In Smith, the defendant argued additionally
that a challenge for cause should not lie since the
statute only allows a challenge when conscientious
scruples against the imposition of the death
penalty would preclude the juror from "finding
the defendant guilty." Since California follows
the bifurcated jury trial system-in which the
jury first decides the question of guilt or innocence
and then decides the question of penalty in a
separate hearing-the defendant argued that a
juror could not withhold a vote of guilt because of
his opposition to a vote for the death penalty,
especially when the trial judge has the power to
empanel a new penalty jury "for good cause
shown". In rejecting this argument the court held
that the statute bifurcating the trial also provides
that the same jury should serve in both hearings
"for reasons of continuity and economy of effort".
Comment: Defendant's last argument would
also appear to be unsound since the reasons given
for the partiality of a death qualified jury would
be just as applicable to a death qualified penalty
jury ("that it cannot be impartial on the nature of
punishment ... authoritarian in nature and not
disposed to humanitarianism".) The adoption of
defendant's Smith's proposal (to refuse the
prosecution challenges for cause in the selection of
the trial jury, but to empanel a new jury for penalty
purposes, allowing the prosecution such challenges)
would therefore accomplish little.
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